Type theory should be able to handle its own meta-theory, both to justify its foundational claims and to obtain a verified implementation. At the core of a type checker for intensional type theory lies an algorithm to check equality of types, or in other words, to check whether two types are convertible. We have formalized in Agda a practical conversion checking algorithm for a dependent type theory with one universe à la Russell, natural numbers, and η-equality for Π types. We prove the algorithm correct via a Kripke logical relation parameterized by a suitable notion of equivalence of terms. We then instantiate the parameterized fundamental lemma twice: once to obtain canonicity and injectivity of type formers, and once again to prove the completeness of the algorithm. Our proof relies on inductive-recursive definitions, but not on the uniqueness of identity proofs. Thus, it is valid in variants of intensional Martin-Löf Type Theory as long as they support induction-recursion, for instance, Extensional, Observational, or Homotopy Type Theory.
INTRODUCTION
A fundamental component of the implementation of a typed functional programming language is an algorithm that checks equality of types; even more so for dependently-typed languages where equality of types is non-trivial, as it depends on the equality of terms. In this paper, we consider a dependent type theory with one universe à la Russell, natural numbers, and η-equality for Π types. The algorithm we implement follows the structure of the one used by the dependently-typed language Agda [2017] , and has been discussed and refined before in the literature Abel and Scherer 2012; Coquand 1991; Harper and Pfenning 2005] . In short, the algorithm will reduce the types or terms under comparison to weak head normal form, compare the heads, and, if they match, recurse on the bodies. Additionally, when comparing terms there is an extra type-directed phase which takes care of η-equality: at function type, we apply the terms under comparison to a fresh variable and continue comparing the results. The type-directed phase could be easily extended to η-equality for other types, by comparing how their elements behave under their eliminators, like it is done in Agda for records, singleton types and others. The proof that the Decidability of Conversion for Type Theory in Type Theory 23:3 theory in type theory using intrinsically well-typed object syntax via quotient inductive types in the meta-language. They prove normalization by evaluation in Agda. However, their formalization is less comprehensive than ours: their object type theory lacks inductive types, and their universe lacks function types.
Overview. Logical relations have been used for many purposes and with equally varied definitions, here we try to give an overview of the design principle used for ours. After specifying the syntax and rules of our type theory λ ΠUN , in Section 2 we prove only a minimal amount of properties by direct induction on typing or equality judgements. In particular, we prove the weakening lemma, i.e., that all the judgments still hold if we apply well-typed renamings. The remaining properties are derived from the logical relation later. We believe this makes the proof more extensible and resilient to changes in the formulation of the typing rules. In Section 2 we also define a typed weak head reduction relation which we prove deterministic. Using a typed variant of reduction gives us the soundness of reduction immediately, which is otherwise established by the subject reduction theorem. Subject reduction relies on the injectivity of the function type constructor which is difficult to prove for a dependent type theory with universes. In fact, it is only a consequence of the logical relation argument. Further, typed reduction is more flexible than untyped reduction and could be equipped with type-directed reduction rules needed in extensions of type theory, for instance, by singleton types or strict equality.
In Section 3 we define a Kripke logical relation, i.e., for each judgment Γ ⊢ J we define a corresponding relation Γ ⊩ J which exhibits the inductive structure of types and their normalization properties. Many expected consequences of the judgments are actually non-trivial to derive. The logical relation rationalizes their meaning by focusing on which observations are supposed to make sense for each term. So for example Γ ⊩ t : T not only tells us that Γ ⊢ t : T but that the same judgment holds respectively for the weak head normal forms, a and A, of t and T , and that the possible observations of a also belong to the logical relation. What we mean by observation depends on the type: if A is the universe then a has to either be neutral or a type former whose subterms also belong in the logical relation, if A is the type of natural numbers then a must be neutral or either zero or suc t for a t in the logical relation, and finally if A is the type of dependent functions, then applying a to a term in the logical relation must produce another such term. Equality judgments are similarly refined by comparing how the weak head normal forms of the terms involved react to observations. In Section 4 we present the conversion algorithm and use the consequences of the fundamental theorem to prove its termination. We prove the properties necessary to instantiate the logical relation with the conversion algorithm and use the fundamental theorem to derive its completeness. With this we can derive the decidability of the conversion judgments, which proves the conversion algorithm's correctness.
In summary, our work makes the following contribution to the programming language and type theory:
• A complete formalization of the decidability of conversion for a dependent type theory with one inductive type and one universe.
• Meta-theory based on typed weak head reduction.
• A single inductive-recursive Kripke logical relation which can be instantiated twice to first prove soundness and then completeness of the conversion algorithm. As a condition of the definition, the logical relation is indexed by a semantic type derivation, but we show proof irrelevance for these derivations. We have restricted our investigation to the minimal core of type theory which gives us large elimination, to expose the structure of the metatheoretical development in its pure form. 2 We believe that our development can serve as a model for the justification and meta-theoretical investigations of extensions of type theory. This paper is best read in a PDF viewer, because definitions and lemmata in blue are clickable and will open the corresponding Agda code in a browser, which is available online. 3 2 A CORE TYPE THEORY WITH ONE UNIVERSE In this section, we introduce λ ΠUN , a dependent type theory with natural numbers and recursion, dependent function types, and one universe. Using the recursor into the universe, we can define types whose shape depends on a value, for instance, the type of functions of arity n ∈ N. Such recursively defined types are sometimes called large eliminations [Werner 1992] ; their presence makes the type theory fully dependent in the sense that value-dependencies cannot be erased from types when constructing a model. 4 
Syntax
The grammar in Fig. 1 describes the raw syntax of λ ΠUN in de Bruijn style. Expressions t ∈ Exp may or may not be in weak head normal form (Whnf), which in turn may or may not be neutral (Ne). An expression in Whnf is an expression that cannot be further reduced by the weak head reduction rules which we will later present. Expressions which are not in Whnf can all be deterministically reduced by these rules. Neutral expressions have a variable in head position that blocks further reductions.
In the formalization, Whnf and neutral are formalized as predicates over expressions. This allows us to use a simple data structure for expressions and, thanks to Agda's dependent pattern matching, it is easy to inspect them. Expressions consist of the functional expressions: function application t u, abstraction λt, dependent function type Π A B; as well as the natural number expressions: zero, successor suc t, natural number type N, natural number recursion natrec A t u v; and variables i x and universe type U. We use t ≡ u to denote syntactical equality of terms, which corresponds to propositional equality in the Agda formalization. For variables, we use de Bruijn [1972] indices i x with x ∈ N. The following positions bind one de Bruijn index: the sole argument of λ, the second argument of Π and the first argument of natrec. Note that the formalization does not enforce well-scopedness of expressions, instead we rely on the typing judgments to implicitly guarantee well-scopedness. In practice this has allowed for some mistakes when formalizing the typing rules, which we had to go back and correct, so intrinsically well-scoped syntax might have been a better choice.
Expressions encompass values and types. For instance, λ(λi 0 ), which would be λA. λx . x with variable names, is the polymorphic identity function of type Π U (Π i 0 i 1 ), which is Π(A:U). Π(x:A). A with names. Some expressions serve both as an object (term) and a type. For instance, N is the type of zero but also an inhabitant of universe U.
Contexts Γ are snoc-lists of (type) expressions to record the types of the free variables of a term or its type. We number the entries in contexts from right to left. For instance, the 3-element context (ϵ, C, B, A), associates the variables i 0 and i 1 and i 2 with types A and B and C, respectively.
Weakenings ρ, if executed on a term t as t[ρ], can raise free de Bruijn indices of term t. The identity weakening id does nothing, the shifting of a weakening ↑ρ adds one to all indices, the lifting of a weakening ⇑ρ is for traversing under binders, and composition ρ • ρ ′ (pronounce: ρ after ρ ′ ) lets us execute first weakening ρ ′ and then ρ.
Substitutions σ , executed as t[σ ], replace the free de Bruijn indices of term t by new terms. The substitution action t[σ ] is defined by recursion on the term, in Fig. 2 we give the relevant rewrite rules that follow from that. For instance, substitution (σ , t) would replace variable i 0 by t and the others according to σ . We abbreviate the singleton substitution action t [id, u] by t [u] ; it just replaces i 0 by u and leaves the other variables unchanged. Weakenings are implicitly coerced to substitutions; this defines t [ρ] . Weakenings and substitutions obey the usual laws, for instance, For non-dependent function types, we introduce the arrow notation. We define it as a Π type with its second element weakened:
as expected, according to the substitution laws.
The expression natrec U A (λλ(N → i 0 )) n, with names natrec U A (λm.λB. N → B) n, codes type N n → A which is short for N → (· · · → (N → A) . . . ) with n occurrences of N. It is an example of a large elimination of value n into universe U, producing a (small) type.
In the remainder of this paper, we reserve and exclusively use names n, m, N , M for neutral expressions, Γ, ∆ for contexts, ρ for weakenings and σ for substitutions. Other names, for instance t, u, A, B, are used for expressions. Names with a bar, for instance t, are used for expressions in Whnf. Note that symbols t and t are distinct, and t need not necessarily denote the Whnf of t. However, we will often use them in that way.
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Rules and Semantics
In Fig. 3 we define the judgements ⊢ Γ for well-formed contexts, Γ ⊢ A for well-formed types, Γ ⊢ A = B for conversion of types, Γ ⊢ t : A for type membership and Γ ⊢ t = u : A for conversion of terms. These are all defined simultaneously: If we look at the following rules, we can see how the judgements depend on each other:
The first two rules let us lift a term or a term equality to the type level if it is of type U. This shows us that the judgements for types, Γ ⊢ A and Γ ⊢ A = B, depend on the judgements for terms Γ ⊢ t : A and Γ ⊢ t = u : A, respectively. The last two rules are the conversion rules, which let us take a term or a term equality to another, equivalent type. Here we see that both Γ ⊢ t : A and Γ ⊢ t = u : A depend on Γ ⊢ A = B. Additionally, with the reflexivity rules, we can see that the equality judgements refer to the typing judgements, thus, all the judgements depend on each other and need to be defined simultaneously.
In Fig. 4 we list the reduction rules of λ ΠUN . Judgement Γ ⊢ t −→ u : A performs a single weak head reduction step from t to u, and Γ ⊢ t −→ * u : A is its reflexive-transitive closure. Our grammar for Whnf captures exactly the well-typed terms that cannot be reduced further with these judgements. Any well-typed term not in Whnf will in finitely many steps reduce to a term in Whnf, yet this fact requires proof by logical relation and will appear quite late in our meta-theoretic development, see the Weak Head Normalization Theorem (3.28) . Weak head normalization allows us to find the canonical head constructor of an expression if there is one.
Note that the reduction rules are typed, which is one of the main technical innovations of Abel, Coquand, and Manna [2016] . We immediately get that reduction is included in conversion. In contrast, with untyped reduction, we would need a type preservation (aka subject reduction) theorem which requires function type injectivity (aka Π injectivity) which in turn needs proof by a logical relation [Abel et al. 2007; Abel and Scherer 2012; Goguen 1994] .
Below, we prove some key properties of the rules.
Lemma 2.1 (Well-formed context). If Γ ⊢ J then ⊢ Γ for any typing or conversion judgement J .
Proof. By induction on the judgement. □ Lemma 2.2 (Reduction subsumed by eqality).
Proof. By induction on the judgement. □
With typing, we can also show that the first element of a reduction is a well-formed type or term.
Lemma 2.3 (Subject typing).
(
Proof. By induction on the reduction and by the well-formedness of the context (2.1). □
The analogue of this lemma, to derive Γ ⊢ B from Γ ⊢ A −→ B and Γ ⊢ u : A from Γ ⊢ t −→ u : A, will be proven as a consequence of the fundamental theorem (see Thm. 3.26).
Lemma 2.4 (Whnfs do not reduce).
We cannot step from a weak head normal form.
Furthermore, a reduction sequence starting with a Whnf goes nowhere:
Proof. By induction on the reduction. □
Reduction is deterministic; each expression has at most one reduct.
Lemma 2.5 (Reduction is deterministic).
Proof. By induction on the reduction, using the fact that Whnfs do not reduce (2.4) . □
We classify the weakenings ρ from Γ to ∆ by judgement ρ : ∆ ≤ Γ , inductively given by the rules to follow. If we apply a well-formed weakening ρ : ∆ ≤ Γ to a term t in Γ, we obtain a term
The rule for weakening composition is missing, because it is admissible.
Lemma 2.6 (Weakening composition). If
Proof. By induction on the structure of well-formed weakenings. □
In the remainder of this article, we shall implicitly assume well-formedness of both contexts, ⊢ ∆ and ⊢ Γ, whenever we mention ρ : ∆ ≤ Γ.
To prove the Weakening Lemma (2.7) we strengthened our typing rules slightly, leading to the hypotheses marked in grey. For instance, in the case of Γ ⊢ λt : Π F G, it is not enough to only have Γ, F ⊢ t : G since we also need Γ ⊢ F . While we can extract Γ ⊢ F from Γ, F ⊢ t : G via the context ⊢ Γ, F , it does not immediately follow that the extracted derivation of Γ ⊢ F is a smaller than the original derivation of Γ ⊢ λt : Π F G, which means that the use of the induction hypothesis would not be justified a priori. Hence, we have strengthened the premises of our rules by an additional hypothesis Γ ⊢ F whenever the context extension Γ, F appears in a hypothesis. A similar technique has been applied by Harper and Pfenning [2005] .
Alternatively, we could use sized types in the metalanguage [Abel and Pientka 2016; Hughes et al. 1996; Sacchini 2013] . This would involve making our judgments sized, so that when we extract Γ ⊢ F from Γ, F ⊢ t : G via context ⊢ Γ, F , the sizes would witness that Γ ⊢ F is smaller than ⊢ Γ, F which is in turn smaller than Γ, F ⊢ t : G. Thus, we could justify the use of the induction hypothesis on Γ ⊢ F .
Lemma 2.7 (Weakening
for any typing, conversion, or reduction judgement J .
Proof. By induction on the judgement. □
Finally, we define well-formed substitutions and their equality as ∆ ⊢ σ : Γ and ∆ ⊢ σ = σ ′ : Γ , inductively by the rules to follow.
, where we call the second component the head of σ and the first component the tail of σ .
Similarly to well-formed weakenings, we shall henceforth assume that the contexts Γ and ∆ are well-formed when we mention ∆ ⊢ σ : Γ or ∆ ⊢ σ = σ ′ : Γ. Unlike well-formed weakenings, we do not need to immediately prove that well-formed substitutions can be applied to well-formed expressions to create new well-formed expressions. Instead, this will follow from the fundamental theorem (see Thm. 3.31).
KRIPKE LOGICAL RELATIONS
To prove decidability of λ ΠUN 's judgemental equality, we will show that it is equivalent to a more structured equality relation, called algorithmic equality Γ ⊢ t⇐⇒ u : A. For one, algorithmic equality will have no rule for transitivity, because the transitivity rule is very non-deterministic: If searching for a derivation of Γ ⊢ t = v : A we have to find a u such that Γ ⊢ t = u : A and Γ ⊢ u = v : A, it is not clear how to guarantee progress. Instead, transitivity for algorithmic equality will be admissible. Secondly, we will prove that to derive Γ ⊢ t = u : A, it is sufficient to derive equality Γ ⊢ t = u : A of the weak head normal forms of t and u. This way, we can exploit the structure of objects during equality check; for instance, injectivity of constructors:
For λ ΠUN and related type theories, the essential properties like weak head normalization and injectivity of constructors are not provable directly by induction on the typing and equality judgements. Instead a logical relation is needed which represents the structure of objects explicitely, such as
• canonicity: a closed term of type N reduces either to zero or suc t, or • function type injectivity: if two function types are equal, then their domains and codomains are equal.
In this section, we will construct a logical relation Γ ⊩ ℓ t = u : A, pronounced łt and u are reducibly equal at type A (of level ℓ in context Γ).ž This relation will be Kripke in the sense that it is closed under weakening. It will expose the inductive structure of objects such that we can prove desired properties like normalization, canonicity, and injectivity. Analogously, we will define reducibility predicates and relations for the other main judgements of λ ΠUN , namely Γ ⊢ A and Γ ⊢ A = B and Γ ⊢ t : A.
Reducible equality Γ ⊩ ℓ t = u : A will be a subrelation of judgemental equality Γ ⊢ t = u : A, but we will later need a similar relation that is a subrelation of algorithmic equality. Thus, we define it as a subrelation of a generic equality relation Γ ⊢ t u : A which can be instantiated for both purposes. To prove that judgemental equality is in turn a subrelation of reducible equality, i.e., reducible equality is complete, we have to introduce a third relation, valid equality Γ ⊩ v ℓ t = u : A. 
Generic Equality
To prove decidability of conversion, we need to introduce two logical relations, one with the conversion judgements for equality and another with algorithmic equality (see Section 4.1). The first logical relation will be used to derive proofs which are necessary to prove the properties of algorithmic equality, one being decidability, while the second logical relation will be used to prove completeness of algorithmic equality. The proofs about these logical relations are quite large, and with the two relations being quite similar, we would like to be able to not duplicate our work. We therefore introduce a notion of generic equality which we use to parameterize the definition of our logical relation, such that it can be instantiated to get the two logical relations we need.
We here give a specification for a set of relations being a generic equality. A generic equality consists of three relations that satisfy the properties we list below: Γ ⊢ A B for equality of types, Γ ⊢ t u : A for equality of terms of a type and Γ ⊢ t ∼ u : A for equality between neutral terms. In the formalization, this is implemented as a record type with one field for each of the three relations and one field for each property.
Property 1 (Subsumption).
(Small types are included in large types.)
Further, generic equality is a subrelation of judgmental equality. Property 6 (Type constructor congruence). If ⊢ Γ then:
Property 7 (Value constructor congruence and η).
Property 8 (Congruence for neutrals).
Now that we have defined all the necessary properties, we will introduce our first instance of generic equality, which is simply judgmental equality.
Instance 1 (Judgmental eqality). The following instantiation of generic equality satisfies all the required properties:
Proof. Subsumption (Prop. 1) is obvious. The weakening property (Prop. 4) is satisfied by the weakening lemma (2.7) and weak head expansion (Prop. 5) is proven by the fact that reduction is subsumed by equality (2.2). The remaining properties are fulfilled by the inference rules of judgmental equality. □
Note that for definitional equality we do not need the distinction between Γ ⊢ t u : A and Γ ⊢ t ∼ u : A. However, for the algorithmic equality it is required, therefore it is part of the specification.
A Logical Relation for Reducibility
In this section, we define reducibility judgements Γ ⊩ ℓ J for types, type equality, terms, and term equality. These judgements take the form of logical predicates and relations [Friedman 1975 ]. They entail well-formedness, i.e., if Γ ⊩ ℓ J then Γ ⊢ J , see the Escape 5 Lemma (3.2). The opposite direction, Γ ⊢ J implies Γ ⊩ ℓ J will be a consequence of the Fundamental Theorem of Logical Relations (3.21) . A logical relation on well-typed open terms is necessarily Kripke, i.e., closed under weakening: if ρ : ∆ ≤ Γ and Γ ⊩ ℓ J then ∆ ⊩ ℓ J . Otherwise, the Fundamental Theorem would fail for binders (λ and Π).
The index ℓ denotes the type level and ranges over 0, 1. We shall define the reducibility judgements by induction on ℓ, i.e., first for small types (ℓ = 0) and then for large types (ℓ = 1), using the judgements for small types. Spelled out, the reducibility judgements are:
A is a reducible type of level ℓ in context Γ Γ ⊩ ℓ A = B A and B are reducibly equal types of level ℓ in context Γ Γ ⊩ ℓ t : A t is a reducible term of level-ℓ type A in context Γ Γ ⊩ ℓ t = u : A t and u are reducibly equal terms of level-ℓ type A in context Γ These judgements will imply that all involved objects are reducible [Girard 1972 ] (in the sense of weak normalization), in particular, all involved objects have a weak head normal form. Further, the judgements do not distinguish between objects that have the same weak head normal form. This is achieved by defining the judgements on weak head normal forms and closing them under weak head expansion.
The qualifier łlogicalž means that objects are characterized by their behavior, e.g., non-neutral objects of type N should reduce to zero or suc t for a reducible t, and functions should yield a reducible result if applied to a reducible argument. As a first approximation, let us define Γ ⊩ ℓ t : Π F G to hold if Γ ⊢ t −→ * t : Π F G and for all Γ ⊩ ℓ a : F we have Γ ⊩ ℓ t a : G [a] . Note that formula Γ ⊩ ℓ a : F occurs negatively in this definition, which has dire consequences: First, we will not be able to inductively prove weakening for this definition, thus, we have to build it into the definition. Hence, we require instead that for all ρ : ∆ ≤ Γ and ∆ ⊩ ℓ a :
Secondly, the negative occurrence prevents us to define Γ ⊩ ℓ t : A as inductive predicate. Instead, we have to define it by recursion on the type A, but not simply on the size of the type expression A, since this does not get smaller in the recursive calls, e.g., ∆ ⊩ ℓ t[ρ] a : G[ρ, a]. We define Γ ⊩ ℓ t : A by recursion on the derivation Tof Γ ⊩ ℓ A, written T :: Γ ⊩ ℓ A, which in turn is an inductive predicate.
Thus, the term reducibility judgement will depend on T and we write Γ ⊩ ℓ t : A/ T . In turn, the rule for Γ ⊩ ℓ Π F G will have to refer to reducible terms of type F , but we may assume ∆ ⊩ ℓ a : F / U to be already defined since U :: Γ ⊩ ℓ F is a subderivation mentioned in the premise of the rule. This definition scheme of interleaving induction and recursion is called induction-recursion [Dybjer 2000] . While the dependence on derivation is necessary for the well-foundedness of the definition process, the exact shape of the derivation should be irrelevant for the reducibility judgements. We prove this a posteriori in Lemma 3.5.
We now to proceed to give the rules for the inductive predicate Γ ⊩ ℓ A , each rule followed by the clauses for the judgements that are simultaneously defined by recursion on its derivation T:
Γ ⊩ ℓ A = B/ T and Γ ⊩ ℓ t : A/ T and Γ ⊩ ℓ t = u : A/ T . In the following, we often refer to the package of these four judgements as the logical relation. The logical relation is implemented under an external well-founded induction on ℓ, so that definitions for large types can make use of the relations for small ones. Most rules are identical for both levels, as most of the type formers belong to both small and large typesÐexcept for the universe U which is necessarily a large type.
Universe. U shall be a large reducible type.
Since we have no reduction on the level of large types, and hence, nothing reduces to U, this rule is trivially closed under weak head expansion. The side condition ℓ ′ <ℓ could be written as ℓ = 1. But since we doing a well-founded induction on ℓ, our formulation is convenient, as it directly gives us the induction hypothesis for ℓ ′ . For derivations T built with that rule we define:
This means that only U is reducibly equal to itself.
• Γ ⊩ ℓ t : U/ T (t is a reducible member of U) iff the following hold:
(1) There exists some t such that Γ ⊢ t :−→ * : t : U and Γ ⊢ t t : U, meaning t has a reflexive whnf. (2) Γ ⊩ ℓ ′ t, which means that t is a reducible small type (already defined by induction hypothesis).
• Γ ⊩ ℓ t = u : U/ T (t and u are reducibly equal members of U) iff: (1) There are t and u such that Γ ⊢ t :−→ * : t : U and Γ ⊢ u :−→ * : u : U and Γ ⊢ t u : U.
This means that t and u have whnfs related by the generic equality. (2) U :: Γ ⊩ ℓ ′ t and Γ ⊩ ℓ ′ u and Γ ⊩ ℓ ′ t = u/ U , meaning that t and u are reducibly equal small types.
Neutrals. Any type that has a neutral whnf N shall be reducible. Since generic equality is not reflexive in general, we also require N to be reflexive.
Here, Γ ⊢ A :−→ * : N is a short-hand for the conjunction of Γ ⊢ A and Γ ⊢ N and Γ ⊢ A −→ * N . For any relation ®, we will from now on use Γ ⊢ A :®: B to signify the conjunction of Γ ⊢ A and Γ ⊢ B and Γ ⊢ A ® B, and use Γ ⊢ t :®: u : A to signify the conjunction of Γ ⊢ t : A and Γ ⊢ u : A and Γ ⊢ t ® u : A. We introduce the extra well-formedness premises because we cannot yet prove Γ ⊢ A or Γ ⊢ B from most of our relations, for instance, neither from Γ ⊢ A = B nor from Γ ⊢ A −→ * B. The lacking property is known as syntactic validity [Harper and Pfenning 2005] or presupposition [Goguen 2000]. It is non-trivial to derive because of the asymmetry present in some of the inference rules, like the congruence rule for application or Π-types. We will obtain syntactic validity (Thm. 3.26) later as a consequence of the fundamental theorem.
Given a derivation T :: Γ ⊩ ℓ A built by the rule for neutral types we define:
Neutral types are reducibly equal to types that have an equal whnf up to generic neutral equality.
• Γ ⊩ ℓ t : A/ T iff there is a neutral n such that Γ ⊢ t :−→ * : n : N and Γ ⊢ n ∼ n : N .
Neutral types are inhabited by terms that have a neutral whnf.
• Γ ⊩ ℓ t = u : A/ T iff Γ ⊢ t :−→ * : n : N and Γ ⊢ u :−→ * : m : N and Γ ⊢ n ∼ m : N for some neutrals n, m. At neutral type, objects are reducibly equal if they have the same whnf up to generic neutral equality.
Natural Numbers. N and its well-formed weak head expansions are reducible types.
Γ ⊢ A :−→ * : N Γ ⊩ ℓ A For a derivation T built by that rule we define:
• Γ ⊩ ℓ t : A/ T iff Γ ⊩N t which is defined to hold iff there exists a whnf t such that:
which is inductively defined by the rules
With that inductive definition, we model the different properties of the possible constructions of natural numbers. For the suc t case, we require that t is a reducible natural number, so that we can properly use natural recursion on the number. For the neutral case, we require that n is well-formed and neutrally reflexive. Finally, for the zero case, we have no additional requirements.
• Γ ⊩ ℓ t = u : A/ T iff Γ ⊩N t = u which is defined to hold iff there exist whnfs t and u such that:
which is analogously to Γ ⊩N w t defined inductively by the rules
Function Spaces. A type with whnf Π F G is reducible if both F and G are reducible in a way detailed in the following rule:
Γ ⊩ ℓ A The notation ł::ž denotes the assignment of a type to a variable in the meta-theory. It is the same as Agda's elementhood relation ł:ž and can for instance be used in ∀u :: U. T(u) which means łfor all u of type U, there is T(u). ž For weakening, we abbreviate (∀ρ :: Wk. ρ : Γ ≤ ∆ =⇒ P) to (∀ρ : Γ ≤ ∆. P).
For A to be a reducible Π-type, we first require A to reduce to Π F G, where F and G are wellformed. Secondly, F has to be reducible under any weakening ρ. Thirdly, for any reducible term a in F [ρ] , the type G[ρ, a] has to be reducible. Finally, if a and b are reducibly equal of type F [ρ] , the types G[ρ, a] and G [ρ, b] are reducibly equal as well. The requirement of reducibility under weakening is needed for proving reducibility under binder cases like λ and Π, and the last two conditions model that G is a F -indexed family of types.
Given a derivation T built by the function space rule we define:
For B to be reducibly equal to A, the type B has to reduce to Π F ′ G ′ which is equal in generic equality to the Π F G, the type A reduces to. We also require that under weakening ρ, the types • Γ ⊩ ℓ t : A/ T iff there is a t such that:
The requirement 3 effectively says that under weakening ρ, given a term a of type F [ρ], we can apply a to t[ρ] with type G[ρ, a]. Requirement 4 basically says the same thing, but for equality. Also note that the reducibility of b is not necessary to complete the definition, but will be helpful in some of the proofs.
• Γ ⊩ ℓ t = u : A/ T iff there is a t and a u such that:
In requirement 6, we say that under weakening ρ, given a term a of type
are equal under application of a. This is necessary to prove congruence of application.
Embedding. Reducible small types can also be viewed as reducible large types.
Given a derivation T built by that rule:
This allows type level embedding of reducible terms.
•
Properties of the Logical Relation
In this section, we establish some basic properties of the logical relation. We start by reflexivity, showing that reducible objects are well-formed, and logically related objects are generically equal.
Lemma 3.1 (Reflexivity). Given T :: Γ ⊩ ℓ A then:
Proof. By induction on T. □ Lemma 3.2 (Escape lemma). Given T :: Γ ⊩ ℓ A then:
Proof. By induction on T and reduction being subsumed by equality (2.2). □
For much of the following proofs, we will need to use induction on two or more derivations of type reducibility for types that are reducibly equal. As there are four different cases for typing derivations (ignoring the embedding case, as one can immediately recurse on its premise), with two derivations we would have 16 cases and with three derivation we would have 64 cases. However, it turns out that a lot of cases can be refuted by the reduction properties. We would like to avoid repeating this refutation process and instead only prove it once.
We introduce what we call the shape view, which is an inductively defined relation on two or more type reducibility derivations such that an instance of the view is only valid if the derivations have a compatible inductive structure, i.e. either they are built with the same inference rule or one of them is an embedding, for which we use the structure of the premise. For example, if we have two type reducibility derivations T and U, and T is built using the natural number type rule: Γ ⊢ A :−→ * : N Γ ⊩ ℓ A Then for U to be related by the view with T, it must be built by the same rule either directly or inside the embedding case. Pattern matching on proofs of the view then allows us to consider only the compatible cases and not have to worry everywhere about the ones where e.g. both A −→ * Π F G and A −→ * N. Proof. By induction on T and T ′ , as Whnfs do not reduce (2.4) and reduction is deterministic (2.5). □ Corollary 3.4 (Reflexive shape view construction). Given T :: Γ ⊩ ℓ A and T ′ :: Γ ⊩ ℓ ′ A, there is an shape view of T and T ′ .
Proof. Directly by reflexivity of reducible equality (3.1) and shape view construction (3.3). □ Lemma 3.5 (Irrelevance). Given T :: Γ ⊩ ℓ A and T ′ :: Γ ⊩ ℓ ′ A then:
Proof. By induction on the shape view of T and T ′ given by reflexive shape view construction (3.4) and by determinism of reduction (2.5) .
□ Even if T and T ′ above can actually differ, e.g. by containing different typing derivations, our irrelevance lemma shows that for the recursively defined judgements, the specific proof of type reducibility T does not matter. We can therefore use these judgements more freely as we no longer need to refer to a specific type reducibility derivation.
Based on this intuition, we will from here on drop the type derivation from the reducibility judgements and instead implicitly state that there exists such a derivation for a judgement. More formally, we let Γ ⊩ ℓ J : A mean that Γ ⊩ ℓ J : A/ T holds for some T :: Γ ⊩ ℓ A. However, this definition is not practical in the implementation as often judgements will share the same type, and thus using only the above definition would introduce extra complications. Therefore, in the implementation, we use derivations explicitly. Lemma 3.6 (Weakening). For all judgements J of the logical relation, given ρ :
Proof. By induction on the derivation of type A and by weakening of well-formed expressions (2.7) and irrelevance (3.5) . □ Lemma 3.7 (Conversion). Given Γ ⊩ ℓ A :=: B then:
Proof. By induction on the shape view (3.3) of equal types A and B, using determinism of reduction (2.5) and irrelevance 3.5. The two directions of iff are proven simultaneously. □ Lemma 3.8 (Symmetry).
Proof. By induction on the shape view (3.3) of the equal types A and B, using determinism of reduction (2.5), irrelevance (3.5) and conversion for reducible equality (3.7). □ Lemma 3.9 (Transitivity).
Proof. By induction on the shape view (3.3) of type A, A ′ and A ′′ , using determinism of reduction (2.5), irrelevance (3.5) and conversion of reducible equality (3.7). □ Lemma 3.10 (Neutrals are reducible). Let Γ ⊩ ℓ A and Γ ⊢ n : A.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of type A and by well-formed weakening (2.7), reduction is subsumed by equality (2.2) and escape (3.2) . □ Lemma 3.11 (Weak head expansion).
Proof. By induction on the reducibility of B, subject typing (2.3) and reflexivity (3.1). □ Lemma 3.12 (Application reducibility).
Proof. For case (1): By applying u instead of a in the following premise of the reducible term t:
Case (2) is solved similarly. This proof is accomplished with escape (3.2), irrelevance (3.5), conversion (3.7), symmetry (3.8), transitivity (3.9) and weak head expansion (3.11). □
Validity Judgements
In Section 3.2, we have introduced reducible objects Γ ⊩ ℓ t : A, which are guaranteed to be welltyped, Γ ⊢ t : A, but we cannot prove the converse yet, i.e., that each well-typed term is reducible. In other words, reducible objects do not directly provide a model of λ ΠUN , in the sense that the interpretation function cannot be implemented by a naive induction on the derivation. The simplest counterexample is the typing rule for λ-abstraction:
we have to show, amongst others, that for any ρ : ∆ ≤ Γ and any
. However, our induction hypothesis Γ, F ⊩ ℓ t : G is too weak to prove that. We would need to substitute with ∆ ⊢ (ρ, a) : (Γ, F ), but reducible terms are not closed under substitution. The way out is by blunt force: we define valid objects Γ ⊩ v ℓ t : A to be objects that are reducible under substitution with reducible objects. Those then model our syntax, i.e., we can prove the fundamental theorem (3.21) which states that Γ ⊢ t : A implies Γ ⊩ v ℓ t : A. Applying valid object t to the identity substitution (3.17), we obtain reducibility Γ ⊩ ℓ t : A and all the good properties that follow from it.
For each of the reducibility judgments we then define their validity counterparts. We will make use of judgments for validity of contexts G :: ⊩ v Γ, reducible substitutions S :: ∆ ⊩ s σ : Γ/ G and their equality ∆ ⊩ s σ = σ ′ : Γ/ G / S which we will define just after through induction-recursion.
First we define valid types as those that are reducible under any reducible substitution and respect their equality.
Note that we will use the above enumeration indexes as projections, e.g., given T :: Γ ⊩ v ℓ A/ G the notation T(S).1 stands for the proof of that A[σ ] is reducible.
Given T as above we define valid type equality, valid terms and valid term equality:
. By induction-recursion, we define ⊩ v Γ inductively by two rules, one for the empty context and one for context expansion, and simultaneously define ∆ ⊩ s σ : Γ/ G and ∆ ⊩ s σ = σ ′ : Γ/ G / S by recursion on the derivation G :: ⊩ v Γ, the second depending on S :: ∆ ⊩ s σ : Γ/ G . For the following definitions, let ∆ be a well-formed context.
For derivations G built with that rule we define that ∆ ⊩ s σ : ϵ/ G holds unconditionally and for all S ::
For derivations G built with that rule we define:
.1 meaning that the head of σ is reducible.
• For all S ::
Note that S.1 stands for the proof that the tail of σ is reducible.
Properties of the Validity Judgements
In preparation for the fundamental theorem, we prove a few properties about validity and reducible substitutions.
As the validity judgements are defined using induction-recursion, we willÐsimilarly to the logical relationÐprove context and typing derivation irrelevance. Lemma 3.13 (Irrelevance). Let G :: ⊩ v Γ and G ′ ::
By induction on G and G ′ , using irrelevance for the reducibility judgements (3.5). □ Derivation irrelevance justifies that we from here on drop the context and type derivation arguments from the validity judgements, as we do for reducibility. Further, when we state ∆ ⊩ s σ :
The escape lemma extends to reducible substitutions:
Lemma 3.14 (Escape for substitutions).
Proof. By induction on ⊩ v Γ, using the escape lemma (3.2) . □
The following lemma is needed to make the fundamental theorem go through the binder cases (λ, Π), in particular, to establish the well-formedness and well-typedness conditions there. It relies on weakening for the reducibility judgements, and is the reason why our logical relation is Kripke in the first place.
Lemma 3.15 (Substitution weakening). Given
Proof. By induction on ⊩ v Γ, using weakening for the reducibility judgements (3.6) . □
Lemma 3.16 (Substitution lifting
Proof. By reducibility of neutrals (3.10) and substitution weakening (3.15) . □ Proof. By induction on the validity of Γ, escape (3.2), irrelevance (3.5) and substitution lifting (3.16) . □ Lemma 3.18 (Substitution eqivalence). ∆ ⊩ s _ = _ : Γ is an equivalence relation on valid substitutions.
Proof. By induction on ⊩ v Γ, using reflexivity (3.1), conversion (3.7), symmetry (3.8) and transitivity (3.9) of reducible equality. □ Corollary 3.19 (Reducibility of validity). All valid types, terms and equalities are reducible.
Proof. By applying the reducible identity substitution (3.17) to the valid object and using reducible irrelevance (3.5) . □ While we can substitute valid objects with arbitrary reducible substitutions and get reducible objects, we do not directly get valid objects. This is because reducibility is not closed under substitution. Thus we will restrict ourselves to proving that substitution of a single term preserves validity.
Lemma 3.20 (Single substitution). Given
ℓ G, we deconstruct that validity judgement and reconstruct it such that when applying a substitution σ , we instead apply (σ , t[σ ]). Otherwise, if Γ ⊩ v ℓ Π F G, we deconstruct the reducible object of the validity judgement and replace a with t[σ ] in the following premise of reducible Π:
All in all, to prove this lemma we need escape (3.2) , irrelevance (3.5), conversion (3.7) and transitivity (3.9) of reducible equality, and reflexivity of substitution (3.18) . □
With the above lemmas, we can now prove the fundamental theorem:
By induction on the well-formed judgements. The most salient cases are, Π and Π-congruence, variables, λ and η-equality, application and application-congruence, and finally natrec and natrec-congruence. This is accomplished with escape (3.2), reducible equality being a equivalence relation (3.1 & 3.8 & 3.9) , conversion (3.7), irrelevance of reducibility (3.5) and validity (3.13), reducibility of neutrals (3.10), weak head expansion (3.11), reducibility of application (3.12), substitution weakening (3.15) and lifting (3.16) , reflexivity of substitutions (3.18 ) and single substitution (3.20) . □
With the fundamental theorem, escape lemma (3.2) and reducibility of validity (3.19) we have effectively proven Γ ⊢ J iff Γ ⊩ v J for the judgements J for types, terms and their respective equality. From this we can also prove Γ ⊢ J iff Γ ⊩ J : Corollary 3.22 (Reducibility of well-formedness). Any well-formed object is reducible.
Proof. Well-formedness implies validity by the fundamental theorem (3.21) instantiated to judgemental equality (1) . Further, validity implies reducibility (3.19) . □
We will also prove a fundamental theorem for substitutions: Proof. By induction on Γ and with the judgmental instance (1): by fundamental theorem (3.21) and reducible irrelevance (3.5), valid irrelevance (3.13) and identity substitution (3.17) . □
Consequences of the Fundamental Theorem
We will here declare and prove some theorems we can now prove using the fundamental theorem with generic equality instance 1.
Theorem 3.24 (Canonicity). Let suc 0 t ≜ t and suc n+1 t ≜ suc (suc n t). Given ϵ ⊢ t : N then there exists n such that ϵ ⊢ t = suc n zero : N.
Proof. Since well-formed objects are reducible (3.22) we have ϵ ⊩N t, on which we induct. □
Proof. By well-formed objects being reducible (3.22) we have Γ ⊩ ℓ Π F G = Π H E, from which injectivity can be retrieved by escape (3.2) , irrelevance (3.5) and reducibility of neutrals (3.10). □ Theorem 3.26 (Syntactic validity).
Proof. By well-formed objects being reducible (3.22) , using induction on the reducible instance of the equality and using the fact that Whnf do not reduce (2.4) and reducible irrelevance (3.5). □
DECIDABILITY
To prove that our language has decidable conversion, we will now introduce an algorithm for conversion of types and terms. The algorithm is defined as a relation which we then show decidable and equivalent to the conversion judgements. In particular completeness is proven by constructing a generic equality instance for the algorithmic equality, so that we can apply our fundamental theorem.
Conversion Algorithm
Our conversion algorithm is defined inductively as seen in Fig. 6 , with six different relations defined simultaneously.
We first have the relations Γ ⊢ n ←→ m : A and Γ ⊢ n←→ m : A, which is the algorithm that determines equality between neutral terms, where the former relation enforces the type A to be in Whnf. Secondly we have the relations Γ ⊢ A ⇐⇒ B and Γ ⊢ A⇐⇒ B, which determines equality between types, where the former of the two relations enforces the types to be in Whnf. Lastly, we have the relations Γ ⊢ t ⇐⇒ u : A and Γ ⊢ t⇐⇒ u : A, which determines equality between terms. Similarly to above the former enforces Whnf of the type and the two terms.
Of note is the third rule of these two relations. We do not check that the type N is equal to the type M inferred by the neutral algorithm. Since we can derive this equality by Lemma 3.33, we can be economic and drop this premise, thus simplifying the relation.
Properties of the Conversion Algorithm
Our next goal is to prove decidability and construct a generic equality instance for the logical relation. It turns out that some of the properties necessary for instance validity is also necessary for proving decidability, thus we will begin proving those properties.
To prove these properties, we also need a notion of context equality, which we will denote as ⊢ Γ = ∆ . We define it inductively: Proof. By induction on the context equality and by substitution (3.31) . □ Lemma 4.2 (Context conversion for reduction and algorithmic eqality). If ⊢ Γ = ∆ and Γ ⊢ J then ∆ ⊢ J for the syntactic judgements J of reduction and algorithmic equality.
Proof. By induction on the judgements and context conversion for typing judgements (4.1). □ Lemma 4.3 (Soundness).
Instance 2 (Algorithmic eqality instance). The following instantiation of generic equality satisfies all the required properties for the logical relation:
A instantiated to the pair Γ ⊢ A = B and Γ ⊢ t←→ u : B Proof. We get the necessary properties from the definition of the algorithm and soundness (4.3), conversion (4.4) , symmetry (4.6), transitivity (4.7), weakening (4.8), lifting (4.9) and neutral lifting (4.10) of algorithmic equality. □
With the instance of generic equality, we can now use the logical relation and the fundamental theorem to prove the completeness of algorithmic equality and finally decidability of conversion: Theorem 4.11 (Completeness of algorithmic eqality).
Proof. By the fundamental theorem (3.21) with algorithmic equality (2) and escape (3.2) . □ Theorem 4.12 (Decidability of conversion).
Proof. By completeness (4.11), soundness (4.3) and decidability of algorithmic equality (4.5). □
CONCLUSION
We have fully formalized a substantial part of the meta-theory of a fragment of Martin-Löf type theory, using a limited set of features of Agda. Our formalization should be implementable in other type theories that support dependent types, universes, and induction-recursion. However, the gap between expressive power of the formalized type theory (the object type theory) and the host type theory (the meta type theory) is fairly large: we require inductionrecursion on the meta level to formalize just one inductive type and one universe on the object level. Yet the grand goal is boot-strapping type theory, meaning the implementation of type theory in a small extension of itself. (An extension in proof-theoretical strength is needed due to Gödel's incompleteness theorem.) A small extension would be, e.g., one more universe or one additional axiom. To advance towards the grand goal, we have to bring object and meta type theory closer together. Obviously, there are two directions: we can make the meta theory weaker, or the object theory stronger.
The main strength of the meta theory comes from induction-recursion [Dybjer 2000; Setzer 2001, 2003 ], which is a very powerful principle, proof-theoretically. Using iterated inductiverecursive definitions in the meta-theory with just one universe, we can model a countable hierarchy of universes of an object theory that lacks induction-recursion. Allowing more universes in the meta-theory, it is likely possible to encode our inductive-recursive logical relation using iterated inductive definitions only, placing the inductive definition of object-level universe n in meta-level universe n. Similar techniques have been used for the semantic modeling and auto-validation of impredicative type theories [Barras 2010; Werner 1994] , using inaccessible cardinals which are analogous to universes. Eliminating induction-recursion would require reworking the central definition of the logical relation in our development, but could lead to a formalized boot-strapping of intensional predicative Martin-Löf Type Theory in itself (plus an extra universe and/or axiom).
Concerning the other direction, making the object theory stronger, this would amount to extending our logical relation to model induction-recursion. This is interesting future work, as it will enhance our understanding of induction-recursion from a syntactic perspective. Recent advances in understanding induction-recursion might aid this research [Ghani et al. 2015] .
It remains interesting to investigate the relationship between the constructions in our proof and standard notions of models of type theory like Categories with Families (CwFs) by Dybjer [1995] . By contrast, Altenkirch and Kaposi [2016; directly define the syntax of type theory as an internal formulation of the initial CwF, i.e., quotienting terms by judgmental equality. In our case, however, we want to discuss reduction, which is only meaningful on terms that are not yet quotiented. A way to bridge this gap could be to formulate a weaker notion of CwFs, where some equations only have to hold up to some equivalence, and use it to restructure our proof, with the intent of providing a more abstract and generalizable presentation.
As for our contributions to proof methods, we have used proof-relevant induction-recursion to define a parameterized logical relation, which allows us to derive important properties like consistency, normalization, and Π-injectivity. We have managed to show that the a priori proofrelevant definitions are proof-irrelevant a posteriori, in the sense that the structure of the inductive derivations we recurse on does not matter in the end, only the judgement it derives (Lemma 3.5). Informally, this aspect is often glossed over; proof irrelevance is often assumed without officially being present in the meta-theory.
We have also parameterized this logical relation such that we only need to prove the fundamental theorem once, even though we have two slightly different instances. For the formalization, this means that we have saved a lot of work, as the parameterization does not add much code considering the size of the logical relation and the proof of the fundamental theorem, which add up to roughly 5000 lines of Agda code.
Our formalization comprises roughly 10.000 lines of Agda code (totaling 500.000 characters). It took 10 man-months of development work and type-checks on a contemporary laptop (16 GB memory, CPU speed 3.3GHz) in around 90 seconds. From this code we could extract the core of a type checker for fully-elaborated terms of a small fragment of the Agda language. It would neither be efficient nor could it do any type reconstruction, however, it could serve as a conceptual double checker of elaborated terms. In contrast, Agda itself consists roughly of 100.000 lines of Haskell code and features printer, parser, elaborator, termination and positivity analysis, pattern matcher and coverage checker, and many other components that are needed for a practically usable implementation of type theory. Verifying all these components with the same rigor as applied to our formalization seems clearly out of reach for an academic institution. However, a verified double checker for the full type theory behind Agda remains as a pursuable, grand challenge.
